1. Europe creates the innovation. America buys the companies. Incubed IT started with seven TU Graz graduates and eventually became part of US telecommunications giant Verizon. Was selling to an American corporation always an attractive outcome, or did you ever seriously consider building an independent European robotics champion? Looking back, was the exit primarily a strategic choice, or did Europe's funding and scaling environment make it the most logical option?

Selling the company was not really on our radar. We were actively pursuing business and partnerships. So when Verizon approached us with a LinkedIn message in 2020 saying they wanted to acquire a robotics company that year, we did not take it too seriously at first. But we wanted to understand the business opportunity behind it.

A few meetings later, there was a moment I still remember very clearly. Verizon presented their strategy, and I honestly could not tell whether they were showing us our own content in their design or whether it was theirs. I was responsible for our strategy, so I turned to Christoph and asked whether he had shared anything with them. He had not.

That was quite a moment. We had arrived at such a similar understanding of where robotics should go, independently of each other. From there, building a future together made sense. So in our case, it was very much a strategic choice, rather than a decision that we had to sell because we were in Europe.

2. Seven founders, one corporate shareholder, and a multimillion-dollar decision. How messy does an exit really get behind closed doors? We often celebrate successful acquisitions but rarely hear about the negotiations, disagreements and compromises behind them. With seven founders and KNAPP AG as a shareholder, what was the toughest moment in the Verizon deal? And was Verizon the first serious buyer, or had you already turned down other opportunities?

I think everyone involved would answer that question a little differently. For me personally, it was one of the most intense periods of my life. There were quite a few different wishes and aspirations to bring together. Luckily, with i5, we had an experienced partner at our side.

A typical round started with i5 and our lawyers, then the co-founders, then the corporate shareholder, then the buyer. Afterwards, we worked our way back: the corporate shareholder, the other co-founders, and finally i5 and our lawyers again. Seven meetings for one round of discussions. You can imagine how much time that takes. Speed mattered: we tried to stay one step ahead so we could help set the direction.

The negotiations were tedious at times, but I would describe them as fair. The hardest moment was the evening before the planned signing. Our wives had surprised us, and we were already celebrating. Then our lawyer called and asked why our CEO wanted to change the bank account for the transaction.

That was how we discovered a cyberattack that had been going on for more than a month. The champagne stopped immediately. Instead, we spent hours on emergency calls. The transaction was put on hold because we did not know whether the attackers had also gained access to our source code. After all that work, suddenly we did not know whether the deal would happen at all.

Over the following weeks, we stayed in close contact with Verizon and were able to establish that the attackers had accessed one office account, but nothing beyond that. We brought the acquisition back on track and signed with a delay. You can imagine the relief.

3. Are European university spin-offs built to become global market leaders, or just attractive acquisition targets? incubed IT emerged from a university robotics team and became an international success story. Yet Europe continues to debate why so much research-driven innovation ultimately ends up in foreign hands. From your experience, what is the biggest obstacle preventing European deep-tech spin-offs from scaling independently: access to capital, commercial ambition, university structures, or something else entirely?

When I was at university, I loved the technical subjects. The commercial ones, I have to admit, I did not see much point in. I had the rather naive idea that the cleverness of my algorithms would be enough to change the European world of robotics.

When we founded incubed IT, we did at least know that we had to earn more than we spent. So half the team did contract work, and the other half spent that money building the product. But once the product became stable, I began to understand how much work it actually takes to bring something to market. That was quite a learning process for me.

There is a lot of discussion about whether Europe has enough funding for later-stage startups. That matters, of course. But from my experience, a lot starts with mindset. We need to see trying something as a worthwhile thing to do. And we need to accept that doing it properly requires a team and resources.

For me, the commercial side and the product have to develop together, from the first idea onwards. Talk about it, try to sell it, find out whether people want it. Give it the chance to become big enough to compete internationally, rather than keeping it to yourself because you are afraid someone might copy it. That is something I understand very differently today than I did at university.

4. You sold your company to Verizon. Then you started another one. What did the exit not solve? After a decade building incubed IT, you returned to entrepreneurship with openmaind, alongside former co-founder Christoph Zehentner. What remained unfinished after the acquisition? And having experienced both the freedom of building a startup and the resources of a global corporation, what are you deliberately doing differently the second time around?

For me, this is quite an easy one: we still want to change how European factories work. That ambition did not go away with the exit.

There are lighthouse factories with impressive levels of automation. But in many factories, things still look much the same: people driving forklifts, people moving carts. These are repetitive jobs, and the cost of all that movement matters for the competitiveness of European manufacturing.

Robot hardware has finally become more affordable. But the engineering effort behind these projects is still far too high. That is the part we want to change with openmaind. Much as Lovable allows people who are not software engineers to build software, we want people who are not robotics experts to be able to plan, install and run fleets of mobile robots, across different hardware vendors.

What I am bringing into it the second time around is the lesson I mentioned earlier: the product and the commercial side need to go together from the start. We want to make this practical for many more factories. I would like to see mobile robots become an everyday part of how our factories work. There is still plenty left to do.

5. If Verizon came knocking on openmaind's door tomorrow, would you sell again, or has your definition of success changed? You've already experienced what many founders spend their careers working toward: a successful exit. What do you think are the biggest hurdles to successful exits in Europe and where does it differ from an exit to the US? Does that make you more willing to sell, or more determined to build something that stays independent? And what would need to change in Europe's investment ecosystem for staying and scaling here to become the more attractive option?

I think starting a company with an exit as the main goal is the wrong way to approach it. It takes too much effort, dedication and risk. There are difficult moments along the way, and you need a reason of your own to keep going.

Of course, an exit can be the step that takes your company to the next stage, with the financial benefits that come with it. So if Verizon knocked on our door tomorrow, we would certainly be open to a serious conversation. The outcome would depend on the opportunity and what we could achieve together.

One difference I have experienced between Europe and the US is where the conversation starts. We Europeans are often very good at identifying risks. I include myself in that. But we should give the opportunities at least as much attention.

For me, that also matters when we talk about Europe's investment ecosystem. We need people willing to back the opportunity and give companies the resources to grow internationally. Independence can be a good outcome, and so can an acquisition. I would not make either one the goal in itself. I would focus on what we want to build, take the opportunities seriously, and remember that there is no safety net for a startup.